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Abstract A unified theory of biology must incorporate a
naturalistic explanation for the origin of life, namely that
given certain conditions, it was highly probable that life
would originate. That theory, however, cannot be solely a
theory of the origin of life. The same general mechanisms
that allowed life to originate must also explain its
subsequent evolution as embodied in the Extended Synthesis,
including the origin of the inherent constraints and regularities
that allowed natural selection to emerge as a natural process.
A naturalistic grounding for the origin of life and its
subsequent evolution, what Darwin called the Law of the
Conditions of Existence, can be found in the natural law of
history, the Second Law of Thermodynamics.
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…there are two factors: namely, the nature of the
organism and the nature of the conditions. The former
seems to be much more the important; for nearly
similar variations sometimes arise under, as far as we
can judge, dissimilar conditions; and, on the other
hand, dissimilar variations arise under conditions which
appear to be nearly uniform. (Darwin 1872, p. 32)
It is generally acknowledged that all organic beings
have been formed on two great laws [my italics]—
unity of type and the conditions of existence…
On my theory, unity of type is explained by unity of
descent. The expression [my italics] of conditions of
existence…is fully embraced by the principle of
natural selection…“Hence in fact the law [my italics]
of the Conditions of Existence is the higher law; as it
includes, through the inheritance of former adaptations,
that of Unity of Type.” (Darwin 1872, p. 194–195)
These passages provide a robust foundation for the
Extended Synthesis (Brooks 2011a, b). With the first,
Darwin stated that the historical narrative of life must take
precedence over perceived fit to current surroundings in
evolutionary explanations. With the second, he implicated a
higher law of the “conditions of existence” without naming
it. The key to knowing the higher law lies in deeper
understanding of the nature of the organism.
What Are Organisms?
Darwin’s dualistic view of the nature of the organism is
reflected in his using adaptation to mean both “function”
and “evolutionary response to environmental change.”
Organisms need adaptations sufficient for survival and
reproduction in the environment of the moment. During
periods of relative environmental stasis, variations on those
adaptations conferring non-zero fitness accumulate in a
population. Organisms whose adaptations are particularly
well suited to those local conditions dominate numerically
at those times, but all variants with non-zero fitness survive
in a species. If a single best-adapted variant replaced all
others in a species, that species would go extinct with the
next environmental change. A subset of adaptations as
“functions” is adaptations as “evolutionary process in
changing environments” (Brooks and McLennan 2002).
D. R. Brooks (*)
Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Toronto,
Toronto, ON M5S 3G5, Canada
e-mail: dan.brooks@utoronto.ca
Evo Edu Outreach (2011) 4:254–261
DOI 10.1007/s12052-011-0328-3
Darwin made this a cornerstone of his theory because
organisms were often found in situations in which the same
adaptation had non-zero fitness in different environments
(e.g., deciduousness in trees originated associated with
drought but also functions well associated with cold
winters), and that organisms found in the same surround-
ings often exhibit many different adaptations for dealing
with those surroundings. During periods of environmental
stasis, Darwinian evolution is “survival of the adequate
with the fittest dominating numerically,” while during
periods of environmental change, Darwinian evolution is
“survival of the adequate with the fittest going extinct,
replaced by a variant that had lower fitness in the previous
environment.” This is The Gambler’s Ruin: no matter how
fit you are (no matter how much of the money at the poker
table you have) at any given place and time, you can still go
extinct if conditions change (someone with almost no
money can have a run of good cards and take all your
money). Just ask the non-avian dinosaurs.
Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995) realized that solving
the fundamental mystery of the nature of the organism lay in
understanding the link between the origin of life and its
subsequent evolution. That understanding lies in recognizing
the duality of organisms as metabolic and information
systems. The earliest major evolutionary transitions involved
trade-offs between the need to exist, a metabolic problem,
and the need to produce new generations, an informational
problem. The resulting division of labor allowed more
efficiency for metabolic and informational functions, but at
the cost of greater integration and mutual dependence.
Darwin’s Law of the Conditions of Existence must
therefore accommodate “Organisms as Metabolic Systems”
and “Organisms as Information Systems” within a single
conceptual framework.
Organisms as Metabolic Systems
Everything that happens has a cost. Physics treats this
reality as a gigantic accounting system governed by the
laws of thermodynamics. The most important of these
laws is the second, which states that in all causal
transformations, energy goes irreversibly from a higher
to a lower state, or ability to do work. Irreversibility
means energy-transforming systems have a sense of
time, and can be said to be “making time” or “buying
time.” The transactions can be measured in terms of the
net transformation of energy (most easily seen as heat
loss) or in terms of the movements of particles in the
system affected by the transformation of energy (called
statistical mechanics). No matter how these transforma-
tions manifest themselves, there is a net cost called
“entropy.” So, another way to characterize the second
law is to say that in every spontaneously occurring
causal activity, entropy increases.
Traditional thermodynamics limited the energy account
of a system. When energy levels inside a given system
reached the same state as those outside the system, there
could not be any more transformations. This is called
“equilibrium.” It is the point at which the energy bank
account has been exhausted, the system has achieved
maximum entropy. Only if new energy of a higher grade than
the surroundings is transferred into the system can it function
again. Recognition of the implications of this version of the
laws of thermodynamics caused panic and denial amongmany
late nineteenth century physicists. Just as the Darwinian reality
inspired “Nature red in tooth and claw,” thermodynamics
inspired “Heat death of the universe.” To complete the circle,
Ludwig von Boltzmann, a pioneer in statistical mechanics,
gave a public lecture in Leipzig in 1905, proclaiming that
Darwinian evolutionwas a statistical mechanical manifestation
of the second law of thermodynamics.
Less than a decade later, Lotka (1913, 1925) became one
of the first twentieth century authors to formally characterize
biological systems as metabolic systems, maintaining them-
selves in highly organized states with respect to their
environments by exchanging matter and energy irreversibly
with their surroundings, taking in relatively high-grade energy
and using it to perform useful work within the system. He
suggested that the inevitable structural decay that accompa-
nies such transactions could be delayed, although not
reversed, by the system’s accumulation of energy from
outside. Even here, organisms have a dual nature. Organisms
undergo heat-generating transformations, involving a net
loss of energy from the system, usually in the form of heat,
and conservative transformations, involve changing free
energy into states that can be stored and utilized in
subsequent transformations. All conservative transformations
in biological systems are coupled with heat generating
transformations, but the reverse is not true; there is a heavy
energetic cost to maintaining structure (Brooks et al. 1989;
Brooks and McLennan 1990; Maurer and Brooks 1991).
Closed, or equilibrium, thermodynamic systems are a
sort of WYSIWYG (what you see is what you get) system.
Given a certain amount of matter and energy, the energy
will be transformed to a lower state and the matter
dispersed in its container as a result. Once the energy
levels inside match the surroundings, and the matter inside
is dispersed maximally given the boundaries of its container,
equilibrium is reached and all work ceases. The bank account
is empty, maximum entropy has been achieved. Equilibrium
systems show no duality in energy use, so that framework
clearly is inadequate for understanding biological systems.
Open, or nonequilibrium, systems allow new energy and
matter to flow through, and so long as the flow continues
the system functions. Total entropy changes (dS) in open
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systems (called entropy production because there is no a
priori entropy maximum) are subdivided into exchanges
between the system and its surroundings (deS: heat-
generating transformations) and production internal to the
system (diS: conservative transformations). Exchanges
between organisms and their surroundings cost a lot and
are accompanied by much waste dissipated into the
surroundings; hence, deS is large compared with diS.
However, open systems can maintain their structural
integrity only by producing entropy internally (diS > 0). Or,
dS ¼ deS þ diS; diS > 0
Organismal production (diS), manifested as information
production, storage and transmission (biomass and inheri-
tance), is critically important, even though it represents a
tiny portion of an organism’s energy budget.
Biological systems maintain themselves in highly orga-
nized states far from thermodynamic equilibrium with respect
to their environments through causal engagement with the
surroundings, mediated by a “phase separation” (Prigogine
1980). That is, there is an “inside” and an “outside,”
delineated by a physical boundary. For all organisms, this
boundary is provided by cell membranes, which are
simultaneously physical barriers between the inside and
outside of the organism and highly selective mechanisms for
modulating the exchange of matter and energy between the
organism and its surroundings. For multicellular organisms,
this barrier is a complex of cell membranes.
Production rules govern internal processes for which
there is an energetic “cost” or “allocation.” Following Zotin
and Zotina (1978), Brooks and Wiley (1988) used y to
denote energy dissipation within the system. The function
includes two major classes of processes: (1) the external
dissipation function (ya), mostly heat generated by pro-
duction within the organism and lost to the surroundings,
adding to the energy lost as a result of bringing matter and
usable energy into the system from the surroundings and
(2) the bound dissipation function (ym), all structure
maintained within the organism. In organisms, ym can be
further subdivided into allocations for accumulating bio-
mass (ybm) and allocations for accumulating information
that can be passed on by inheritance (y im). Thus, diS can be
viewed heuristically as
diS ¼ ya þ ybm þ y im
Heat-generating processes, deS and ya, occur when
energy and entropy flow in opposite directions, moving
the system toward disordered states. Organisms slow these
effects by “exporting” entropy to the surroundings; if all the
heat generated by processes associated with bringing matter
and energy into an organism stayed in the organism, it
would rapidly die. Conservative transformations are char-
acterized by energy and entropy flowing in the same
direction, entropy production being retained within the
system and tending to move the system toward more
structured states. As entropy and energy flow through
biological systems at different rates, structure accumulates
at different levels of organization; furthermore, the structure
at any given level is constrained by energy and entropy
flows at other levels.
Organisms maintain themselves through time by exploit-
ing “resource gradients” in the surroundings (Ulanowicz
1997), determined by interactions between abiotic and
biotic factors. Abiotic factors can be structured in part by
metabolic components of biological production (ya). For
example, both the capture of incoming solar energy by
organisms and their mass re-radiation of heat affect the
thermal profile of the earth. Likewise, oxygen production as
a byproduct of photosynthesis or of carbon dioxide as a
byproduct of aerobic metabolism affect the composition of
the earth’s atmosphere. More simply, production (diS) can
influence exchanges (deS). Biotic factors are also subject to
the influences of the structural portion of biological
production (ybm þ y im). Metabolism tends to move biological
systems in the direction of minimizing energy gradients in
the environment, to the extent permitted by the inherited
capabilities (and limitations) of the organisms involved
(Ulanowicz 1997; Brooks and McLennan 2000). In other
words, accumulated genetic information (ybm þ y im) con-
strains the patterns of energy flow (ya) within organisms
and between organisms and their surroundings (deS).
Biological systems produce entropy at different rates
because energy stored by conservative transformations is
degraded at different rates. At the lowest organizational
levels, shortest time intervals, and smallest spatial scales,
the greatest contribution to = is ya. If we examine cellular
or sub-cellular structure, metabolic processes dominate
explanations of observed structure. Most entropy production
is dissipated into heat loss. At more intermediate levels of
organization, space, or time, ybm predominates. Most entropy
production at this scale is dissipated into accumulating and
maintaining biomass. Finally, on the largest and longest
scales, y im predominates, and the patterns relevant to
biological explanations represent accumulation and mainte-
nance of genetic diversity. From the perspective of the
surroundings, these patterns are correlated with energy
gradients, whereas from the perspective of the genealogical
system, they are correlated with phylogenetic relationships
and patterns of geographical distribution mirroring geological
evolution occurring on similar temporal and spatial scales.
The Controversy
Theoretical studies (Prigogine and Wiame 1946) and popular
texts (e.g., Schrödinger 1945; Blum 1968; Prigogine 1980)
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laid the groundwork for a view which, ironically, links life
and its evolution to the second law mostly by its presumptive
ability to circumvent the law. Schrödinger, Blum and
Prigogine argued that life was physically improbable,
demanding an explanation involving rare events. Following
the New Synthesis, they accepted the progressive nature of
evolution, also contrary to the expectations of the second
law, at least in its nineteenth century formulation. Prigogine
et al. developed a heuristic model in which life originated as
an improbable event and evolved into increasingly improb-
able states. The model suggested that life could not have
originated “on its own,” it must have had “outside help,” by
which they meant thermodynamic flows from the surround-
ings into the system, deS. And they discovered something
exciting—near-equilibrium, random fluctuations in the
exchanges between the system and surroundings could
theoretically produce states of lowered entropy. They
reasoned that if such fluctuations were, on rare occasions,
“captured” in a stable state, they could move themselves
farther and farther away from thermodynamic equilibrium,
“feeding on negentropy” (Schrödinger 1945). This view
became so widespread that when Broda (1983) discussed
Boltzmann’s 1905 lecture, he inserted “[negentropy]” after
“entropy” throughout the text.
The metabolic duality of organisms provided presump-
tive support. In the process of exchanging matter and
energy with their surroundings, organisms degrade their
surroundings more than themselves, remaining in a low-
entropy state relative to their surroundings [this is the
meaning of negentropy, not that entropy has decreased].
This view informed two general concepts in biology—a
form of self-organization (Depew and Weber 1995) and the
principle of maximum entropy production (Swenson 1989).
Superficially appearing to be the Darwinian duality (the
nature of the organism and the nature of the conditions),
“self-organization” in this context means the tendency for
the system to organize itself according to the nature of the
surroundings. The principle of maximum entropy produc-
tion asserts that systems utilize resources from the
surroundings as rapidly as possible, construed as a kind of
selection in which whoever sequesters the most energy
fastest wins, starving out their slower competitors. Both
concepts ascribe causality to the surroundings; significantly
absent is thermodynamic production, diS. Thus, there is no
“nature of the organism.”
Nor do biological systems behave as the principle of
maximum entropy production suggests. Zotin and Zotina
(1978) documented the general pattern. Early in ontogeny,
organisms exhibit high metabolic rates, similar to maximum
entropy production. This “immature” stage, however, is
always replaced by a “mature” phase, characterized by
reduced metabolic rate. Finally, all organisms enter a
“senescent” stage in which metabolic rate decreases to a
point that the organism no longer functions. This same
dynamic occurs during ecosystem succession (Ulanowicz
1997). Decreasing rates of entropy production are deter-
mined by interactions between the surroundings and the
“sense of self” the organism inherits from its parent(s).
In contrast with Darwin, Boltzmann felt life was a
struggle for entropy, not for survival. I think both were
correct. In one sense, organisms struggle to stay alive, and
do so by processing matter and energy from their
surroundings. They must find the necessary forms of matter
and energy to sustain (their) lives. Organisms finding
themselves in a place and time where such resources are
available are thus able to “survive” in Boltzmann’s sense.
His viewpoint is easier to see if we consider the source
rather than the fate of the matter and energy organisms use
to sustain life. Living systems must find usable energy.
Plants find abundant “free energy” in the form of photons
of light coming from the sun. The source of those photons
is thermonuclear reactions in the sun involving states of
matter and energy that no terrestrial life can use. Being
relatively low energy products of the sun’s thermonuclear
reactions “exported from the system to the surroundings,”
photons are part of the sun’s entropy production. Plant
biomass built using photonic energy is part of the entropy
production of the plant. When an herbivore eats plant
biomass, it’s feeding on entropy.
Evolution is more than just living, however, it’s descent
with modification. Biological systems, from organisms to
ecosystems, exist in a low-entropy state relative to their
surroundings, but not relative to their own previous state.
This is the result of producing and maintaining structure
that is complex and organized relative to the surroundings,
according to inherited information specifying internal
production rules, which are largely insensitive to the details
of environmental conditions (Darwin’s Necessary Misfit).
Organisms as Information Systems
Information theory has developed two general perspectives,
“communications theory” and “measurement theory.” Both
agree that information (1) is anything transmitted from a
“source” through a “channel” to a “receiver” and (2) is an
abstraction rather than a material part of the system.
In communications theory, the amount of information
sent from a source is calculated using a statistical entropy
function. Transmission errors result from poor encoding at
the source or from noise in the transmission channel.
Meaningful information is that subset of transmitted
information actually recorded by the receiver (there may
or may not be a separate decoder). All processes affecting
transmission and reception of the information decrease the
entropy of the message from its maximal value at the
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source. Physical entropies are expected to increase as a
result of work done on the system, so either information
transmission is not a physical process or the communications
view of entropy is non-physical.
Measurement theory provides a second formalism.
Brillouin (1962) distinguished “free information,” an
abstraction involved in descriptive exercises, and “bound
information,” referring to material properties of the system
(but not requiring that information be a material part of the
system). Bound information is determined with respect to
the “complexions” (microstates) of the system. It is
calculated using a statistical entropy function but, contrary
to communications theory, is expected to exist only in
systems for which there is a non-arbitrary microstate/
macrostate distinction. Bound information is defined as
I ¼ Hmax  Hobs
where, Hmax refers to the totally relaxed state of the system
(usually estimated by randomizing the observed components
of the system). Brillouin defined I as “negentropy,” which is
converted into bound information by measurement (measur-
ing devices are receivers), so negentropy=information.
There must be an additional conception of information
for biology because biological information (based on
nucleic acids) is a communications system with a material
basis. What is needed is a formalism in which (1) information
is a material part of a system rather than just an abstract
representation and (2) there is an objective difference between
macrostates and microstates in calculations of informational
entropies.
The Brooks/Wiley Proposal
Brooks and Wiley (1988) used the informational “entropy
function” to examine changes in information over time in
biologically realistic situations. The function summarizes
changes in the number of parts, the number of kinds of
parts, and the relative frequency of the different kinds of
parts. This has four illuminating formulations: (1) the
“actual” entropy (Hobs; information content or expressed
information) calculated on the basis of the observed
distribution of components of the system; (2) the “maximum
possible” entropy (Hmax; information capacity), estimated by
calculating the entropy value for the components of the
system at any given time if they were all randomized; (3) an
absolute difference (Hmax–Hobs; information: Gatlin 1972;
macroscopic information: Landsberg 1984a,b); and (4) two
conceptually related relative differences (Hobs / Hmax; Order:
Landsberg 1984a,b) and Id /Hmax (Id=information density;
redundancy: Gatlin 1972). Simple heuristic simulations
emulating biological processes associated with the storage
and transmission of information (e.g., reproduction, ontogeny,
and speciation) produced three generalities (for illustrations,
see Brooks andWiley 1988): (1) Hobs increases over time; (2)
Hobs is a “concave function” of time, as historical constraints
retard the rate of entropy increases; and (3) the difference
between Hmax and Hobs increases over time, permitting the
growth of structure and organization (Collier and Hooker
1999). Point 3 thus points to an informational duality in the
nature of the organism; entropy and information/organization/
order (redundancy) both increase over time. If Hmax is a
function of the capacity, or potential, of a system and Hobs is
a function of the content, or expression, of some of that
potential, the difference between total information capacity
and information content is proportional to the constraints,
inherent and extrinsic, on the system. For example, additive
genetic variance could be construed as an indication of
population-level entropy, while genetic correlations would
be an indication of organizing principles constraining that
variance.
There is a physical basis for the Brooks–Wiley formalism,
which shows increasing rather than decreasing informational
entropy because the calculations account for historical
correlations among the parts of the system. Frautschi (1982,
1988; see also Landsberg 1984a,b) contrasted two classes of
processes that generate entropy. The first is equilibrating
temperatures between system and surroundings. Biological
systems exhibit this behavior through processes that result in
heat loss. The second is expansion of the phase space (the
realm of possibilities) in which the system resides, increasing
its number of accessible microstates (possible configura-
tions). Organization increases so long as equilibration
(equiprobable distribution of the system over its microstates)
occurs at a slower rate than the expansion of the phase space,
allowing a lag between the increase in realized entropy
(Hobs) and the increase in the maximum possible entropy of
the system (Hmax), which is a linear function of the logarithm
of the number of states or size of the phase space. If the
phase space expands faster than the system can fill it up,
increasing entropy can be accompanied by the emergence of
organized structure. In cosmology, this argument explains
the spontaneous and irreversible emergence of stars, solar
systems, galaxies, and other organized structures, in which
fundamental forces linking material bodies, like gravity, slow
down the entropic diffusion of matter in the universe to such
an extent that organized structures emerge as a result of, and
not at the expense of, increasing entropy. In biological
systems, mutations (as well as higher order genotypic and
epigenetic phenomena) expand the genetic phase space,
while their inheritance systems (Jablonka and Lamb 1995;
Maynard Smith and Szathmary 1995; 1999; Szathmary
2000), as well as the environments in which they exist, play
roles analogous to fundamental forces like gravity (Brooks
and Wiley 1988).
Collier (e.g., 1998, 2000) related biological information
to the causal capacity of a system, its ability to impose
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distinctions on its surroundings. In a way, the emphasis is
on how the system produces effects on measuring devices
and not on how the measuring devices are affected. Collier
proposed that physical (=material) information systems
occur as arrays, or multi-dimensional messages, in which
macrostate and microstate distinctions are distinguished
non-arbitrarily, and that in order for this information to be
related to physical concepts there must be (1) a physical
(material) basis for the information, (2) an energetic cost in
producing the information, and (3) a real (non-arbitrary)
macrostate/microstate distinction. Since the discovery of
the chemical structure and function of DNA, there has been
a material basis for biological information, satisfying (1)
above (see also Collier and Hooker 1999; Brooks et al.
1989; Smith 1988, 1998, 2000).
Energy dissipated within the system as a result of work
done by the system (ya of diS) is intropy, meaning internal
thermal entropy (overhead of Ulanowicz 1997). Energy that
is converted into structure (ym of diS) is enformation,
meaning intrinsic information (or structural entropy; these
distinctions originated in Collier, 1990). Conservative
processes within biological systems are coupled with heat-
generating processes, so there is an energetic cost associ-
ated with the production and maintenance of biological
information. Intropy and enformation are interconvertable
(e.g., energy brought in from the surroundings can be
converted into structure, say glycogen, which can then be
converted into heat). Intropy is converted into enformation
by cohesive properties of the system. Cohesive properties,
ranging from molecular affinities to cell–cell adhesion, to
genetic compatibility, mate recognition, and genealogy, also
provide resistance to fluctuations from lower levels,
allowing macroscopic properties to emerge. Cohesion is
thus analogous to inertia. The major transitions in evolution
(Maynard Smith and Szathmary 1995; 1999) are all
associated with the emergence of new forms of cohesion,
which permit enformation to be stored and transmitted
more efficiently.
Cohesive properties are also the key to understanding
microstate/macrostate distinctions in biological systems.
According to Collier, macrostate/microstate distinctions
are determined objectively by part/whole associations. The
number of accessible microstates is increased by the
production of new components, either at a given level or
through the opening up of new levels of organization.
Biological systems accomplish this by conservative trans-
formations. For example, auto-catalytic processes producing
monomers make “monomer space” available for molecular
evolution. Some monomers have high chemical affinities for
each other and will spontaneously clump into dimers and
polymers. Once polymers begin to form, “polymer space”
becomes available to the evolving system. At this level,
polymers are macrostates, and monomer and dimer distribu-
tions are microstates. Causal interactions among polymers
create new levels of organization in which polymer distribu-
tions are the microstates and new levels of organization are the
macrostates, and so on. Each new functional level creates a
hierarchy of increasing structural intricacy, manifested by
increasing allocation of the entropy production in structure.
Therefore, allocation of diS to ym might be proportional to
entropy increases due to the expansion of phase space
resulting from the creation of new possible microstates. A
protein-coding unit might be considered a macrostate, while
all the actual sequences that code for that protein would be
the microstates; a locus could be a macrostate, and all alleles
corresponding to that locus the microstates; phenotypes
could be macrostates, and all genotypes corresponding to a
given phenotype would be microstates.
That organisms are digital replicators is a key element in
understanding their essentially unlimited capacity for
variation (Maynard Smith and Szathmary 1995, 1999;
Szathmary 2000) and also accords with the Brooks–Wiley
formalism. Consider a replicator comprising a string of
DNA 1,000 bases long. According to traditional calcula-
tions, the sequence contains a maximum of 2,000 bits of
potential information (this fully defines its structure at all
levels). Such calculations have been used to suggest that
there is not enough information in the DNA of a cell to
specify an entire organism, and therefore information from
the surroundings must be incorporated during development.
This parallels interpretations of self-organization as systems
organizing themselves with respect to the surroundings—
the organism’s information system is cheaply produced
because its only function is allowing the system to conform
to the much larger amount of information in the surroundings
(and for which the energetic cost, deS, is much greater). If the
string were a holistic replicator, it would function strictly as a
single unit. If that string functioned as a digital replicator,
however, it could be read at multiple levels (in this case,
1,000 levels from single bases to the entire sequence) to
produce a diversity of information. Each of these readings
would yield a maximum information capacity of 2,000 bits.
Thus, if each reading of a given sequence is equivalent to all
others informationally, and if these readings are not
interactive (i.e., not cohesive), the total possible readings
would have a maximum information capacity of 2,002,000
bits. If the bases are interactive, then these self-interactions
will constrain the total information capacity. The total
amount of information that could be expressed at any one
point in time is highly constrained by the fact that bases (a
similar argument holds for genes, tissues, and organisms) are
causally linked, so accessing some information will limit (or
eliminate) expression of other—cohesion therefore putting
an upper limit on the amount of information potential/
capacity that could be expressed at any one time. Accessing
the same system in different ways sequentially through time
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permits the same constrained quantity of information to be
additive, since at each point in time a different 2,000 bits is
expressed. The information system is cheap to produce but
has more than enough potential information to specify an
organism—in fact, much of that potential must be dissipated
(diS) in order to distil out an organized organism. Ontogeny
is that distillation process—it’s an energy-efficient algorithm
for converting digital information into analog output using
matter and energy from the surroundings (deS) to accomplish
the task, paid for by dissipating potential information.
A final aspect of the Brooks–Wiley formalism pertains
to the meaning of information. Many information theorists
define information as meaningful only if a receiver converts
it. A neo-Darwinian perspective is that replicators are the
source of biological information, and the environment in
which they live is the receiver, the nature of the conditions
determining what is meaningful (Gatlin 1972). The Darwinian
interpretation is that replicators are both source and receiver,
transmitting information from themselves at t0 to themselves
at some future tn. The nature of the organism thus determines
what is meaningful information (Csanyi 1989; Kampis 1991,
1998; Brooks and McLennan 1997). This perspective has
parallels in self-correcting computer programs and self-
correcting capacities of DNA. Information is meaningful
because it is organized in such a way that an organism
develops and transmits the information to the next generation
(Collier and Hooker 1999). The environment “selects” among
varying forms of meaningful information; it does not give
them meaning.
Summary
“We’re Just Recycled History Machines” (Jimmy Buffett,
Don’t Chu-know)
A unified theory of biology must incorporate natural-
istic explanations for, but cannot be solely a theory of,
the origin of life. The same general mechanisms that
allowed life to originate must also explain its subse-
quent evolution within a single narrative flow. Maynard
Smith and Szathmary (1995) understood this, so their
framework is the best candidate for the Extended Synthe-
sis (Brooks 2011a,b). Boltzmann believed Darwin’s Law
of the Conditions of Existence was the Second Law of
Thermodynamics. Advances in the thermodynamics of
open systems have allowed us to confirm that in the
duality of organisms as metabolic and information systems
(Vasas et al. 2010).
Associating evolutionary dynamics with thermodynamic
production underscores the importance of time and history
in biological explanations. All genomes are historically
conservative, making evolution affordable; they are copies
of templates, and the templates do not have to be
reconstructed in every generation. History lowers the cost
of innovation because innovations are modifications of pre-
existing information. History lowers the cost of ecological
specialization because specialists on widespread resources
have many options (Brooks and McLennan 2002; Agosta et
al. 2010). Adaptability occurs virtually for free because
adaptability is a synonym for retained history of what
worked in the past. Finally, history lowers the cost of
community organization if colonizers bring traits that allow
them to use resources not being used by residents, thereby
avoiding competition (Brooks and McLennan 2002).
We now have a thumbnail of a Theory of Biology. The
Meta-Game of Life is “Persist as long as possible by
integrating information flow and functional engagement
with the surroundings.” The strategy for accomplishing the
meta-game is “Increasing the efficiency of the information
flow (the nature of the organism) enhances self-stability,
which creates various forms of selection, which enhance
mutual stability between the system and its surroundings
(the nature of the conditions).” Even more simply,
paraphrasing Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995), “So
long as the information flows, adaptation will take care of
itself.”
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